Employment Law Newsletter 2/2026

Dear readers,

A warm welcome to the summer edition of our employment law newsletter. Temperatures are rising, and with them, it seems, the number of current employment policy issues and relevant court decisions. As always, we provide you with a concise overview of both here.

We begin with a legislative development: the reform of the General Equal Treatment Act (Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz – AGG). The forthcoming amendments to the Act are driven by European law and primarily involve changes to the procedure for asserting potential claims arising from discrimination. Our Cologne-based colleagues Gina Susann Kriwat and Luisa Sause outline the key aspects of the reform and assess them.

The following article by Stephan Sura, also from Cologne, deals with a topic that is only seemingly lighter: the presence of dogs in the workplace. Since the COVID-19 pandemic at the very latest, more and more employers have been tolerating their employees bringing their four-legged friends to work on a temporary or even permanent basis – but do employees actually have a right to do so? And how can an employer introduce a ban?

In our ten most important court decisions, we then present as usual what we consider to be the most interesting rulings from the labour courts, this time covering a range of topics from the relevance of total working hours in an equal pay claim through the dismissal of a whistleblower to the challenge of a works council election following an interim re-election. 

This time, Jan Hansen contributes to our section ‘Current developments in pensions’ with a recent decision from the Federal Labour Court on the subject of the abuse of rights in claiming a retirement pension. As always, we conclude with a look at our unyer network, this time to Luxembourg, where Raphaël Schindler and Capucine Falgareiro Douchet from our local Luther team shed light on the rules governing public holidays there.

We hope you find our selection an informative read and look forward to your feedback. All the best and a lovely summer!

Yours,

Achim Braner 

The Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection and the Federal Ministry of Education, Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth in Germany recently presented a draft amendment to the General Equal Treatment Act (Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz – AGG). The first reading in German Parliament took place on 11 June 2026. The following article analyses the contents and implications of the forthcoming changes.

Background

The aim of the reform is to further develop the General Equal Treatment Act into a modern and effective instrument for protection against discrimination. However, the specific background lies in two developments under EU law: Firstly, infringement proceedings initiated by the European Commission in 2015 against Germany for inadequate transposition of Directive 2004/113/EC on equal treatment between men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services. And secondly, the transposition of the new Directives (EU) 2024/1499 and (EU) 2024/1500 on standards for equality bodies, the transposition deadline for which expired on 19 June 2026.

Extension of the time limit for bringing claims under the Act and extension of the ‘gender’ ground

Under the new version of the Act, the time limit for asserting claims for compensation and damages under Sections 15 and 21 General Equal Treatment Act is to be extended from the current two months to four months. Furthermore, in the infringement proceedings against Germany, the European Commission criticised the fact that Directive 2004/113/EC does not permit quantitative exceptions to its scope of application. Consequently, the restriction of the civil law prohibition of discrimination in the current Section 19 (1) Sentence 1 General Equal Treatment Act to mass transactions in relation to the characteristic of ‘gender’ is incompatible with the Directive. The reform to the Act now adds a new second sentence to provision, according to which unlawful discrimination on grounds of sex is also possible outside the context of mass transactions.

Extension of protection against sexual harassment, for maternity and pregnancy

By deleting the reference to Section 2 (1) No. 1-4 General Equal Treatment Act in its future Section 3 (4), sexual harassment is to be regarded as discrimination throughout the entire material scope of Section 2 (1) General Equal Treatment Act. Furthermore, the deletion of Section 2 (1) No. 1-4 in Section 3 (1) General Equal Treatment Act clarifies that less favourable treatment of a woman on the grounds of pregnancy or maternity always constitutes direct discrimination on the grounds of sex.

Expansion of the Federal Anti-Discrimination Agency (Antidiskriminierungsstelle – ADS)

In the implementation of the above-mentioned EU Directives, the Anti-Discrimination Agency is to provide better support to victims of discrimination under the General Equal Treatment Act and play an active role in dispute resolution. To this end, a conciliation body for alternative dispute resolution is to be established within the Anti-Discrimination Agency. In addition, the Agency’s scope for participation in court proceedings will be expanded: in future, it may act as a representative of the disadvantaged party and submit statements.

Amendment of the ‘church clause’ 

Furthermore, Section 9 General Equal Treatment Act is to be adapted to the case law of the ECJ and the Federal Constitutional Court (see ECJ, decision of 17 April 2018 – C-414/16 [Egenberger] and Federal Constitutional Court, decision of 29 September 2025 – 2 BvR 934/19). Until now, the wording of the provision allowed for the conclusion that differential treatment could be justified both on the basis of the employer’s right to self-determination and on the basis of the nature of the work. In the future, there must always be a link to the specific work. The previous alternatives of ‘right to self-determination’ and ‘link to the work’ are thus combined.

Change from ‘age’ to ‘life age’

Across the board within the Act, the ground of discrimination ‘age’ is renamed ‘life age’. This makes it clear that discrimination can occur not only on the grounds of advanced age, but also in the case of young people. Nevertheless, the change does not entail any substantive modification, as case law has already been based on this principle.

Consequences

In practice, the employee’s ability to initiate conciliation proceedings and the employer’s involvement in such proceedings have particular implications for the employer. Employers may be required to respond substantively to allegations of discrimination within short timeframes. This necessitates robust internal documentation of selection decisions, performance appraisals and complaints procedures. Although statements made during conciliation proceedings are not necessarily admissible in subsequent court proceedings, they may be. Added to this is the extension of the time limit for bringing claims to four months. For employers, this results in an even longer period of uncertainty as to whether, for example, rejected applicants will pursue allegations of discrimination. 

Meanwhile, the problem of abusive claims by ‘AGG-hoppers’, meaning people who systematically provoke or file mass claims of discrimination in order to secure compensation under Section 15 (2) General Equal Treatment Act, remains unresolved. For employers, the question arises as to what will happen if these persons also make use of the Anti-Discrimination Agency’s new infrastructure: the Agency is required to examine enquiries without regard to discrimination, but there is no provision for a preliminary check for abuse. In practice, it is advisable not to wait for the reform to serve as the catalyst for professionalising discrimination and complaints management. Those who focus early on clear structures, careful documentation and targeted training limit risks in General Equal Treatment Act proceedings and contribute to achieving the objective of equal treatment within the organisation. 

Gina Susann Kriwat, Luther Rechtsanwaltsgesellschaft mbH, Cologne

Luisa Sause, Luther Rechtsanwaltsgesellschaft mbH, Cologne

In an increasing number of workplaces, employees are bringing their four-legged friends with them, sometimes even on a regular basis. Many employers are tolerant of this, yet there is often uncertainty regarding the legal permissibility of such arrangements and the options for prohibiting them.

No general right

More and more employers are encouraging staff to bring their dogs to work, whether to support employees, to lighten the atmosphere in the workplace, or to gain an advantage in the competition for skilled workers. However, bringing pets into the office also carries the potential for conflict, usually when they cause disruption. Generally speaking, an employee has no legal right to bring a dog to the workplace. Conversely, however, an employee also has no legal right to demand that a ban on dogs be imposed, unless such a ban is already in place across the board for safety or hygiene reasons. In practice, the presence of dogs is simply tolerated – and it is precisely this that raises questions.

Past tolerance

The fact that dogs have been tolerated in the workplace up to now does not necessarily create a binding precedent for the future. Within the scope of their managerial authority, employers are entitled to specify the nature, place and time of work at their reasonable discretion, provided these conditions are not already determined by a collective agreement, a works agreement or by law. This also covers employees’ conduct in the workplace. Regardless of whether bringing dogs to work is classified as an aspect of the work itself or of the workplace regulations, it is subject to the employer’s instructions. 

In the court ruling that remains the most relevant to this day, the Higher Labour Court Düsseldorf ruled in 2014 that the employer’s right to issue instructions also extends to the instruction that a dog should no longer be brought onto the premises in future (decision of 24 March 2014 – 9 Sa 1207/13). Even if the employer has given the dog owner permission, this may be revoked, as such permission is logically subject to the provision that the dog does not disrupt work processes and is not perceived as a threat. The fact that an employee may have been allowed to bring a dog into the office for several years does not limit the employer’s right to issue instructions, particularly if the animal’s threatening behaviour causes anxiety amongst other staff members. The situation would only be different if the employer had expressly authorised the dog to be brought into the office.

Legal basis for a right to bring dogs into the office?

Mere tolerance of dogs does not, therefore, automatically amount to an (overall) consent – and even if it did, the employer may revoke it within the limits of reasonable discretion pursuant to Section 315 German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch – BGB). Furthermore, the establishment of a company practice is also ruled out: Any tolerance, even if unconditional, merely specifies the parameters under which the employee carries out their work. However, no entitlement arises from this in the absence of a permanent intention on the part of the employer to commit to this, as long as the employer does not demonstrably accept the permanent presence of the animals (see also Higher Labour Court Rhineland-Palatinate, decision of 8 September 2022 – 2 Sa 490/21). 

A right to bring a dog to work may, however, arise if this is permitted for other employees. If dogs are tolerated in general, the employer may, under the principle of equal treatment, only prohibit a specific employee from doing so if there are objective criteria for differentiation, such as a particular spatial situation or the behaviour of the specific animal. Exceptions to the principles outlined above apply where an employee is medically dependent on a dog to manage their daily life and, consequently, to perform their work. In the case of such assistance dogs, there is, in principle, a right to bring the dog to work or for the employer to tolerate its presence.

Prohibitions

Without prior authorisation, the employer may at any time order that dogs must not be brought to the workplace. Once the animals have been tolerated, the imposition of a ban and the associated exercise of the employer’s right to issue instructions must, in turn, be in accordance with reasonable discretion. Converting a permission to bring a dog to work into a ban is particularly relevant if a dog disrupts business operations or if employees are afraid of it. The same applies to the restructuring of business premises. If an employee breaches an established ban, this constitutes a breach of duty which may justify a written warning and, in the event of a repeat offence, dismissal on grounds of conduct. To avoid conflicts and to ensure acceptance, employers should proactively establish rules governing the bringing of dogs into the workplace and make it clear that, in the event of disruptions or operational restructuring, the permission may be revoked at the employer’s reasonable discretion.

Liability

If dogs are brought to the workplace, this may give rise to a rare instance of animal owner liability under Section 833 Sentence 1 German Civil Code, which also applies to employees who bring dogs onto the premises. Such an employee is liable for any injuries to other employees or damage to premises and property. A limitation of liability applies only to service dogs. If a dog is not brought in as an assistance dog, there is no connection to the performance of the employee’s duties. Joint liability on the part of the employer may be considered if the employer has not prohibited the dog from being brought into the workplace despite behavioural issues.

Involvement of the works council

Under Section 87 (1) No. 1 Works Constitution Act (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz – BetrVG), the works council has a co-determination right in matters concerning the organisation of the workplace and the conduct of employees within it. The scope of co-determination covers the organisation of staff relations, i. e. the establishment of rules of conduct to ensure undisturbed work processes, collective cooperation and harmonious working relationships, over which the employer may exert influence. By contrast, regulations concerning work performance – that is, measures relating solely to the performance of work – are exempt from co-determination. Bringing dogs to the workplace primarily affects order within the workplace and the interaction between employees, but not the core of their work. Consequently, the works council must be involved when regulations concerning the bringing of dogs to work are drawn up. This also applies where the presence of a service dog is concerned. In such cases, there is likewise a right of co-determination regarding the arrangements for bringing the dog to work, but not regarding the whether or not.

Stephan Sura, Luther Rechtsanwaltsgesellschaft mbH, Cologne 

In the case of the (notional) promotion of works council members, knowledge, skills and qualifications acquired whilst in office must also be taken into account, insofar as these are relevant to the position in question.

Federal Labour Court, decision of 5 November 2025 – 7 AZR 185/24 

The case

The plaintiff is a full-time works council member at the defendant’s company. In 2020, he applied for an internally advertised post as press officer. During his term of office on the works council, he had already attended several specialist seminars relating to press and public relations work and had obtained a so-called ‘management licence’. At the end of the recruitment process, the defendant decided to offer the plaintiff the post of press spokesperson with remuneration at in accordance with the ‘Tarif Plus’ pay scale of the in-house collective agreement. However, the plaintiff declined the offer so that he could continue to devote himself to his works council duties. Consequently, the defendant did not increase his remuneration, but initially continued to pay him at his previous pay grade and later – suspecting that the plaintiff had been unduly favoured – even downgraded him. The plaintiff then argued that he had a constructive right to promotion under Section 78 Sentence 2 Works Constitution Act (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz – BetrVG) in conjunction with Section 611a (2) German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch – BGB) to the post of press spokesperson offered to him, and consequently demanded remuneration in accordance with the ‘Tarif Plus’ pay scale.

The decision

Whilst the Higher Labour Court Lower had regarded the defendant’s offer arising from the recruitment process for the post of press spokesperson as an impermissible favouring of the plaintiff in his capacity as a works council member and had dismissed the claim before, the Federal Labour Court upheld the plaintiff’s appeal on points of law and held that he was entitled to remuneration in accordance with the ‘Tarif Plus’ pay scale. The conditions for the so-called notional promotion claim pursuant to Section 78 Sentence 2 Works Constitution Act in conjunction with Section 611a (2) German Civil Code were met. A notional promotion claim arises, amongst other things, where a works council member successfully applies for a post and declines it solely on the basis of their works council activities. This occurred when the plaintiff turned down the post of press spokesperson offered to him. Nor did the promotion result in any impermissible preferential treatment of the plaintiff within the meaning of Section 78 Sentence 2 Works Constitution Act. Taking into account the specialist seminars he attended and the management licence he obtained when filling the post was permissible, as these were qualifications that were in fact relevant to the post. The fact that the qualifications were acquired whilst he was in the works council did not preclude them from being taken into account.

Our commentary

The Federal Labour Court confirms its previous case law, according to which it is, in principle, permissible to take into account, when promoting a works council member, those skills, knowledge or qualifications relevant to the promotion that were acquired whilst in office. In this regard, the court distinguishes between knowledge that is solely an expression of the performance of official duties, for example negotiating on an equal footing with board members and managers, carrying out complex tasks or being involved in complex corporate decision-making processes, the consideration of which would constitute impermissible favouritism, and those skills that reflect the individual qualifications of the works council member, such as attending seminars and training courses or completing further training and professional development programmes not related to their office. These must be taken into account in promotion decisions. The distinguishing criteria must always be taken into account in promotion decisions: in the event of a correction to remuneration or the withdrawal of an offer by the employer, the employer always bears the burden of proof to demonstrate that the works council member is being unduly favoured by the promotion. If the employer fails to do so, the works council may claim remuneration commensurate with the promoted position.

Leif Born, Luther Rechtsanwaltsgesellschaft mbH, Essen

In an equal pay claim, employees must specifically set out the gross hourly wage they were paid and why their role is the same or equivalent to that of the comparator. General references are not sufficient for this purpose.

Federal Labour Court, decision of 23 October 2025 – 8 AZR 269/24

The case

The plaintiff was employed as a veterinary surgeon at her father’s veterinary clinic. Together with her brother, who also worked at the clinic, she was listed on the clinic’s website under the heading ‘Clinic Management’. Whilst her brother received a gross basic salary of EUR 7,200.00, the plaintiff received only EUR 3,900.00 gross.By means of a staged claim, the plaintiff first sought information on the gross hourly rates of all male vets at the clinic and subsequently claimed compensation for a gender-based pay gap for the period from 2020 to early 2022. She argued that she had held the same position and worked full-time, just like her brother. The defendant clinic countered that the plaintiff had worked only 20 hours per week during the period in question. Furthermore, she had been able to take time off at any time, which she had regularly done to look after her children. Her brother, by contrast, had worked full-time and taken on managerial responsibilities. The Labour Court and the Higher Labour Court dismissed the claim and the appeal respectively. 

The decision

Similarly, the Federal Labour Court dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal. There was no entitlement to equal pay, as the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate and prove that she had received lower pay than a male colleague for the same or equivalent work. Although Section 2 (2) Sentence 1 Remuneration Transparency Act (Entgelttransparenzgesetz – EntgTranspG) refers to the presumption of causality under Section 22 General Equal Treatment Act (Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz – AGG), the principles of EU law must be observed when applying national provisions. In order to trigger the presumption under Section 22 General Equal Treatment Act, the plaintiff must provide specific evidence that she was paid less than a male colleague performing the same or equivalent work. When assessing whether a pay disparity exists, and where weekly working hours differ, the gross hourly wage must first be determined and compared. However, in the absence of sufficiently specific evidence from the plaintiff regarding the amount of her gross hourly wage, a pay comparison was not possible in this case. Although the plaintiff had argued that she had worked full-time, this had been sufficiently contested by the defendant. Finally, the plaintiff had likewise failed to demonstrate that her brother’s role was comparable to her own, as there was no corresponding evidence as to which specific managerial tasks she had undertaken.

Our commentary

With this decision, the Federal Labour Court remains consistent with its previous case law on the Remuneration Transparency Act and the General Equal Treatment Act, according to which pay discrimination is only presumed if a lower salary is actually paid for the same or equivalent work. The decision clarifies the requirements regarding the burden of presentation and proof on the employees concerned and makes it clear that the statutory reversal of the burden of proof does not mean that plaintiffs can rely on vague assertions. Rather, a detailed and comprehensive statement of facts regarding actual working hours and the specific scope of duties is required, and, conversely, a substantiated challenge on the part of the employer is absolutely essential. Furthermore, a precise figure for the hourly wage is necessary in order to calculate the potential pay gap. For employers, a substantiated challenge to working hours and the scope of duties can be crucial in fending off equal pay claims.

Sandra Sfinis, Luther Rechtsanwaltsgesellschaft mbH, Hamburg

Dr Anna Mayr, Luther Rechtsanwaltsgesellschaft mbH, Hamburg

Achim Braner:

Calling an employee whilst they are on holiday is not off-limits – at least for a hearing in cases of summary dismissal

Dr Jan-Moritz M. Hahn:

Self-inflicted incapacity for work in cases of illness following breast surgery

Lukas Paetzold and Charlotte Elsner, LL.M.:

Consequences of a unilateral, irrevocable suspension following a successful action for unfair dismissal

Kristina Gutzke:

Church membership as a condition of employment may still be permissible